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I. THE AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION RESULTING IN A DIGITAL 
FOOTPRINT AND THE CORRESPONDING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM 
Routine. Wake up. Shower. Get ready. Go to Starbucks. 
Guzzle coffee. Text. Drive to school. Walk to class. Leave class. Drive 
home for lunch. Text. Check social media. Drive back to school. Walk 
to class. Leave class. Get into the car. Drive home. Arrive home. Send 
Snapchats. Text. Go back to school for meetings. Arrive back home. 
Post picture on Instagram. Read for class. Make dinner. Text. Read for 
class. Listen to music. Get ready for bed. Sleep. Do it all over again. 
If a law enforcement official wanted to determine an 
individual’s identity or trace the individual’s movements, the official 
would be able to create a decently accurate profile within a day. Since 
one’s movements are generally the same everyday with little deviation, 
physically following someone would provide a wealth of information. 
In addition, since our society extensively uses technology, each of us 
generates a digital footprint that the officer could track by getting 
access to the following: car GPS, iPhone location, internet history, 
social media accounts, video surveillance footage from street cameras, 
etc.1 From just this aggregation of information collected in a short 
period of time, the officer would be able to determine, among other 
things, the individual’s name, address, school, classroom location 
within the building, friends, family members, stores frequented, model 
of car, and credit card information. Besides these typical forms of 
government surveillance, individuals in public are also exposed to 
sousveillance,2 a term used to describe citizens’ ability to record events 
                                                 
 1 Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 554 (2017). 
 2 See Jascha Hoffman, Sousveillance, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 
10, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/books/why-1984-is-a-2017-
must-read.html (The etymology of surveillance and sousveillance is as follows: 
“Surveillance, from the French for ‘watching over,’ refers to the monitoring of 
people by some higher authority—the police, for instance. Now there’s 
sousveillance, or ‘watching from below.’ It refers to the reverse tactic: the monitoring 
of authorities.”). 
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on their cellphones or other devices and their capability to disseminate 
the recording to a wide network.3 
Although surveillance produces several advantages including 
risk assessment, deterrence, data collection, and crime solving, the 
aforementioned scenario does call to mind Orwell’s Big Brother and 
Bentham’s panopticon.4 This dystopian feeling of always being 
watched is only one of many issues to consider in addition to data 
storage, anonymity issues, and privacy rights. 
This reduction of privacy, the ability to be free from 
government intrusion and the view of others5 draws to the forefront 
several questions: (1) what is considered public, and (2) what 
protections are in place to keep the intimate details of our lives private? 
This comment will discuss how the rapid advancements in technology 
“blur the distinction between private space and the public domain,” 
which complicates the framework on which the courts rely.6 The law 
needs to keep pace with technological advancement so that discretion 
to create baseline rules is not left completely in the hands of law 
enforcement.7 
The privacy protections offered to citizens depend upon the 
country being discussed. This is due to varying societal values, 
constitutions/laws/acts that are in place, legal systems, and population 
                                                 
 3 See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 395, 406 (2016). 
 4 See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 1949) (Nineteen Eighty-Four is a dystopian novel that illustrates an 
omnipotent government which extensively watches and controls the lives of the 
citizens of Oceania through the use of CCTV and the limitation of available 
information). Bentham’s Panopticon was originally implemented in prisons, which 
allowed around the clock surveillance from a central viewing point for guards. Fan, 
supra note 3, at 407. The panopticon promoted compliance and deterred bad 
behavior as inmates did not know when or if they were being watched. Id. This notion 
has since been applied to outside situations with regard to the feeling of being 
watched. Id. 
 5 See Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing’s New Visibility and the Role 
of “Smartphone Journalism” as a Form of Freedom-Preserving Reciprocal Surveillance, 14 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 59, 95 (2014). 
 6 Donohue, supra note 1, at 582. 
 7 See Fan, supra note 3, at 402. 
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sizes. Although the United States and United Kingdom share “[t]he 
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna 
Carta,”8 the American and United Kingdom approaches to privacy 
differ. The implications of these approaches to privacy will be seen 
later in the comment through a discussion of surveillance and 
sousveillance and their impact on individuals’ objective and subjective 
privacy rights while in public.9 
Although the United Kingdom’s system may provide some 
useful techniques for employing surveillance that could be used to help 
balance the crime control agenda and the constitutional privacy issues 
faced by the United States, the United States would be unable to 
implement the extensive United Kingdom mass surveillance system 
effectively. Several factors would significantly inhibit this 
implementation, namely size and the opposition the government 
would face. Because of the concerns mentioned above, the United 
States requires a different approach to surveillance; a balance needs to 
be struck between the government’s disclosure obligations and 
citizens’ privacy rights in order for the system to be effective.  
This comment proceeds in seven parts. Part I served as a brief 
introduction to the topic of surveillance and its relevance to our 
everyday lives and rights. Part II of this comment explains the 
development of surveillance since its inception as well as its 
intersection with privacy rights. Part III of this comment compares the 
United States and the United Kingdom’s interpretations of the right to 
privacy through history, laws and regulations currently in place, and 
case law. Part IV of this comment debates the advantages and 
disadvantages of surveillance by analyzing its various methods such as 
Closed Circuit Television, Policy Body Cameras, and Sousveillance. 
Part V of this comment evaluates and scrutinizes the possibility of 
implementing the UK system in the US due to several problems. Part 
VI of this comment suggests several potential ways in which clarity can 
                                                 
 8 Nadia Shamsi, The Search for Truth: A Comparative Look at Criminal Jury Trials 
in the United States and England, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 203 (2016). 
 9 See Fan, supra note 3, at 406 (stating that, today, sousveillance is when “the 
power of recording people or events is put in the hands of everyday people who can 
cheaply acquire a small sousveillance device, such as a cell phone camera, and 
disseminate the recordings and images all over the world via the Internet”). 
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be provided to subside some of the confusion surrounding privacy 
rights and surveillance. Finally, Part VII summarizes and concludes the 
comment. 
II. WHAT IS SURVEILLANCE: A TIMELINE OF PROGRESSION AND ITS 
INTERSECTION WITH PRIVACY 
Surveillance is everywhere and infiltrates our everyday lives. 
Some examples given by acclaimed Georgetown Professor of Law, 
Laura Donohue, include: “Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals; GPS chips; . . . 
automated license plate readers; network collection data; . . . Internet 
protocol databases; financial transactions; consumer purchases; closed 
circuit television; remote biometric identification; and unmanned aerial 
systems.”10 These methods of collecting information about individuals 
raise privacy concerns because “locational data, collected in bulk, yields 
deep insight into individuals’ lives.”11 This data reveals personal 
information, including where we have been, who we were with, and 
places we frequent, to name a few. 
Although technology has allowed for new forms of 
surveillance in addition to a new set of privacy rights challenges, 
surveillance is not a new issue; these issues “can be dated back to the 
times of the Magna Carta in 1215, when it became desirable for nobles 
to monitor and check the wealth of the English King John.”12 The 
types of government mass surveillance that will be discussed later on 
also are not a new phenomenon; these programs began around the 
time of “the First and Second World Wars” including national 
databases as well as census registration which were used as modes of 
obtaining and recording information about individuals in society.13 
Before the proliferation of advanced technology, gathering records and 
surveilling the public required “a great deal of manpower.”14 The 
                                                 
 10 Donohue, supra note 1, at 613. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Briana Sojeong Lee, Security over Surveillance in the US, in 4 THE PPE 
REVIEW: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 8, 13 (Michelle Beauchamp et al. 
eds., 2017). 
 13 Id. at 11, 13. 
 14 Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better 
Privacy Protection for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151, 154 (2017). 
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mobility, cost, and ease with which these devices can be used changed 
the perspective of those utilizing surveillance and those being watched 
because surveillance placement no longer required significant cost-
benefit analysis.15 In contrast, the intrusive nature of these 
advancements has led to changing perspectives on privacy as well. The 
“traditional theories of privacy . . . focus was on actual threats to 
privacy,” but after these technological advancements, “a perceived 
threat to privacy in public” came to light.16 An actual threat to privacy 
would be individuals intruding into one’s home—therefore literally 
invading their privacy—while perceived threats to privacy are 
subjective feelings of invasion while in public. 
Due to the widespread reach of social media and the Internet, 
surveillance has been placed in the hands of anyone who possesses a 
cell phone with the ability to take pictures or record video. As 
technology advances and surveillance increases, what society’s 
expectation of privacy encompasses changes as well because 
surveillance and sousveillance have the ability to impede privacy rights 
while in public.17 Whenever the topic of surveillance is mentioned, the 
references to Orwell’s Big Brother and Bentham’s Panopticon are not 
far behind.18 These concepts reflect the idea of being constantly 
watched—Orwell’s about citizens being watched by the government 
and Bentham’s about prisoners being watched by the guards.19 
Technology has resulted in a dramatic shift in policing values and 
methods and has “thereby both raised the stakes and lowered the 
barriers to intensive, intrusive surveillance.”20 
III. PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Although the United States and United Kingdom share “the 
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna 
                                                 
 15 Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment 
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 562 (2017). 
 16 Scott, supra note 14, at 154. 
 17 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 680. 
 18 See GEORGE ORWELL, supra note 4; see Fan, supra note 3, at 407. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 15, at 562. 
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Carta,” the American and United Kingdom legal systems “diverge in 
terms of jury selection, the jury process, roles of the barristers, judges, 
and defendants, and the use of evidence.”21 These systematic 
dissimilarities have resulted in differing approaches to surveillance and 
privacy rights. 
A. Privacy and Surveillance in the United Kingdom 
1. Progression of Surveillance in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has become the “most watched citizenry 
in Europe” and possibly the world.22 According to the former Director 
of the National CCTV23 Users Group, “there are ‘more cameras here 
in proportion to the population than anywhere else, including the 
United States.’”24 These CCTVs were installed in the 1990s under the 
crime control model.25 Before the invention of CCTV to monitor 
public areas, law enforcement typically relied on “street patrols, 
undercover officers, informants, and members of the general public” 
to gather intelligence about the community.26 As of 2011 data, there 
were “approximately 1.85 million public CCTV cameras operating in 
the United Kingdom, with the average Briton caught on camera 
approximately 70 times each day.”27 The number has since grown to 
                                                 
 21 Shamsi, supra note 8, at 203, 225. 
 22 BENJAMIN J. GOOLD, CCTV AND POLICING: PUBLIC AREA 
SURVEILLANCE AND POLICE PRACTICES IN BRITAIN 1, n.3 (Per-Olof Wikström et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 23 Id. at 12. (Closed Circuit Television, colloquially known as CCTV, is 
defined as “a system in which a number of video cameras are connected in a closed 
circuit or loop, with the images produced being sent to a central television monitor.”) 
 24 Dipesh Gadher, Smile, you’re on 300 candid cameras . . . , SUNDAY TIMES 
(LONDON) (February 14, 1999); See also Goold, supra note 22, at 1–2, 1 n.3. 
 25 See Brandon C. Welsh, David P. Farrington & Sema A. Taheri, Effectiveness 
and Social Costs of Public Area Surveillance for Crime Prevention, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 111, 112 (2015); see generally Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal 
Process: The Victim Participation Model, UTAH L. REV. 289, 292-93 (1999). (The crime 
control model is a methodology of law enforcement, which predominantly values 
efficiently reducing crime. In contrast, there is the due process model, which values 
the importance of individual rights and liberties as well as limiting government 
power.). 
 26 Goold, supra note 22, at 3, 96. 
 27 Welsh, supra note 25, at 112. 
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produce a “network of four million closed-circuit cameras” even 
before the “deployment of an estimated 2,000 additional cameras worn 
by police officers.”28 
This dramatic increase in surveillance in the United Kingdom 
was introduced with surprisingly limited backlash.29 At the time of its 
implementation, there were a number of factors that contributed to 
the easy transition of surveillance into everyday life including: (1) a 
general societal “shift in thinking about crime and issues relating to 
criminal justice” and (2) “politicians and policy-makers were in search 
of a new solution to the problem of crime and . . . a way of convincing 
the public that they were serious about crime prevention.”30 The desire 
for change and solutions for crime brought about an overall approval 
of surveillance by the government and the public where they 
“accept[ed] at face value claims about the CCTV’s supposed 
benefits.”31 Additionally, it was decently well known and implied that 
criticism of CCTV and its implementation were not welcomed by the 
Home Office, a department of the government which funded a 
significant portion of the surveillance program.32 
CCTV and other forms of surveillance have evolved and now 
allow the police to have equipment to aggregate large quantities of 
information on a constant basis.33 Technology, specifically the 
abundance of CCTVs, has influenced the methodology and practice of 
policing and how law enforcement allocates their resources in the 
United Kingdom.34 
2. Laws and Regulations in Place 
Because the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution that 
explicitly lists the rights to which citizens are entitled, privacy 
                                                 
 28 Fan, supra note 3, at 419. 
 29 Goold, supra note 22, at 19–21. 
 30 Id. at 20, 27. 
 31 Id. at 24, 26. See also Fan, supra note 3, at 419–20. 
 32 Goold, supra note 22, at 26. 
 33 See Goold, supra note 22, at 96, 167. 
 34 Id. at 167–177. 
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protection has encountered several foundational issues.35 Traditionally, 
UK law has “failed to recognize the existence of any general right to 
privacy,” but there are “legal protection[s] for the freedom of 
expression, the protection of reputation, and the right to privacy.”36 
The courts have drawn from several different sources “to develop a 
notion of privacy, in each case extending the scope of the existing law 
by way of analogy and implication.”37 For example, “trespass, nuisance, 
breach of copyright, and defamation” are some of the causes of action 
that have been utilized in an effort to promote a right to privacy.38 
Thus, creating a right through a compilation of sources and laws ad 
hoc, rather than through a binding document, has therefore proven 
difficult. 
The Humans Rights Act was adopted by the United Kingdom 
in 1988.39 This Act “provides for the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law.”40 The European 
Convention on Human Rights recognizes “a citizen’s right to ‘respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’”41 
Although this may seem to explicitly provide a right to privacy, the 
interpretation of this provision does not convey the application to 
public spaces.42 
As previously mentioned, the United Kingdom is the “most 
watched citizenry in Europe.”43 Despite this widespread use of 
surveillance, the “central government has been reluctant to impose 
legal restraints on the use of this technology by the police and local 
authorities.”44 Because of this void of restraints or explicit rights, the 
                                                 
 35 Id. at 90. 
 36 Id. at 90. See also Alexandra Paslawsky, The Growth of Social Media Norms and 
Governments’ Attempts at Regulation, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1485, 1500 (2012). 
 37 Goold, supra note 22, at 91. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Paslawsky, supra note 36, at 1500–01. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Goold, supra note 22, at 92; Council of Europe, European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14 (Nov. 4, 1950), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html. 
 42 See Goold, supra note 22, at 92. 
 43 Id. at 1 & n.3. 
 44 Id. at 89. 
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“legitimate use of CCTV and the limits that should be placed on public 
area surveillance has fallen to local officials and police officers.”45 The 
typical justification for the use of surveillance has been the security 
rationale which is a very generalized, expansive power regarding public 
safety concerns.46 However, such a rationale could very easily be 
manipulated and be made applicable to many different situations. 
Allowing vast discretion with little to no supervision or limit is grounds 
for abuse. 
The United Kingdom has implemented its own FOIA, 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, which “creates a right of access to 
information held by public authorities, subject to exemptions.”47 The 
notions and rights presented in this Act have promoted the idea of 
transparency and have allowed for the use of CCTV video recordings 
as evidence in criminal trials.48 
3. Case Law  
In Friedl v. Austria (1996), the European Court of Human 
Rights grappled with the concept of surveillance and infringement on 
privacy rights.49 The plaintiff in this case, Friedl, was attending a public 
demonstration in Vienna when he was photographed by police, which 
he claimed violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights that recognizes “a citizen’s right to ‘respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”50 He argued that his 
                                                 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Paslawsky, supra note 36, at 1535. 
 47 Fan, supra note 3, at 422; Freedom of Information Act 2000 c. 36 (UK), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/pdfs/ukpga_20000036_en.pdf. 
 48 See Shamsi, supra note 8, at 223. 
 49 See Friedl v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 83 (1996). 
 50 Goold, supra note 22, at 92. Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights states in its completion: 
Right to respect for private and family life[:] 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
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privacy rights were violated by “the taking of the photograph, the 
establishing of his identity, and the recording of his personal data, as 
well as the storing of this material.”51 The Court dismissed the case, 
explaining that Article 8 of the Convention applied only to private 
spheres of life, not public life, so he was not extended those privacy 
protections.52 As a result of this case, the Court began to discuss the 
dichotomy of private versus public life. Civil liberties groups and 
academics alike have argued that the court’s discussion can be 
interpreted to mean that “privacy rights may in certain circumstances, 
be asserted in public places.”53 
In Peck v. United Kingdom (2003), the European Court of Human 
Rights considered privacy rights and the role of Article 8 of the 
Convention which reinvigorated the discussion of private versus 
public life and the corresponding expectations of privacy.54 In this case, 
the plaintiff argued that his Article 8 Right to Respect of Privacy was 
violated when a local authority disclosed CCTV recordings and 
photographs, “which resulted in images of himself being published and 
broadcast on a local and national level.”55 He also contested this 
disclosure because “no effective remedy existed in relation to the 
violation of his Art. 8 right” so this action also violated Article 13 of 
the Convention, which identifies the right to an effective remedy.56 The 
Court acknowledged “meaningful distinctions can be drawn between 
different types of public activities and circumstances.”57 However, in 
                                                 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights (Nov. 4 1950), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 51 Goold, supra note 22, at 92. 
 52 Id. at 93. 
 53 Goold, supra note 22, at 94. 
 54 See generally Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 ECHR (2003). 
 55 Id. at 41. 
 56 Id.; Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights (Nov. 4, 1950), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. (stating the following 
in Article 13: “[r]ight to an effective remedy[:] [e]veryone whose rights and freedoms 
as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity.”). 
 57 Goold, supra note 22, at 94–95, 94 n.17. 
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this case, the problem was with the disclosure, not with the 
surveillance; the surveillance was justified by the legitimate aim of 
public safety.58 Therefore, although this case discussed privacy and 
acknowledged its application to different circumstances, its aim was 
disclosure. Ultimately, Article 8 only requires a “‘respect’ for an 
individual’s private life” and it has yet to be interpreted “to give rise to 
a general right of privacy.”59 
The death of Ian Tomlinson at the G20 British riots in 
London, England in 2009 and the ensuing investigation and trial 
provided an important new piece of surveillance: citizens’ media.60 
Tomlinson was a bystander of the riots and was struck by a police 
officer with a baton “without any apparent provocation.”61 He 
eventually succumbed to the injuries he sustained.62 All of this was 
unintentionally captured on the cell phone of another individual at the 
riot, and the video “has now been viewed nearly a million times on . . . 
YouTube.”63 This incident provoked an investigation and eventually 
led to a trial for the officer.64 The officer was acquitted of 
manslaughter, but the recognition of citizens’ media and its ability to 
hold the police accountable had lasting effects.65 Citizens’ media has 
now led to a new method of surveillance called sousveillance, which 
permits individuals to record interactions with police for accountability 
purposes.66 
B. Privacy and Surveillance in the United States 
1. Progression of Surveillance in the United States 
The surveillance system in the United States combines many 
different sources of information, including traffic cameras, police body 
cameras, CCTV, and individuals’ cellphone recordings/social media. 
                                                 
 58 Id. at 95. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Newell, supra note 5, at 95. 
 61 Id. at 95. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Newell, supra note 5, at 95. 
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Over the course of the “past decade, the United States experienced a 
rather dramatic growth in the use of CCTV cameras in a wide array of 
public places.”67 The increased use of sousveillance augmented the 
increase in CCTV. Sousveillance explains “how recording is no longer 
conducted overhead by someone with power over the subject, a 
directionality formerly denoted by the French preposition sur in 
surveillance.”68 Citizens now have their own form of surveillance 
through technology to serve as a remedy for the uneven balance of 
surveillance capabilities between the government and the public. This 
form of surveillance is seen when “the power of recording people or 
events is put in the hands of everyday people who can cheaply acquire 
a small sousveillance device, such as a cell phone camera and 
disseminate the recordings and images all over the world via the 
Internet [sic].”69 This recording and distribution ability changes the 
power dynamic between law enforcement and citizens by promoting 
checks and balances where each is able to hold the other accountable. 
Since approximately two-thirds of Americans use social media 
accounts, social media has served as an effective platform to allow 
citizens to use their cellphones and other devices to record or 
photograph and then subsequently disperse the content to a 
widespread network of people around the world.70 These changes in 
technology have “blurred the lines between private citizen and 
journalist” because “many of our images of current events come from 
bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital camera, rather than a 
traditional film crew.”71 
2. Law in Place 
The United States has a written constitution, which dictates 
through several avenues that individuals in the United States have a 
fundamental right to privacy. The Fourth Amendment states: 
                                                 
 67 Welsh, supra note 25, at 112. 
 68 Fan, supra note 3, at 406. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Scott, supra note 14, at 151. 
 71 Kermit V. Lipez, The First Amendment and the Police in the Digital Age, 69 ME. 
L. REV. 215, 221 (2017). 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.72 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and establishes a person’s right to 
privacy; the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut explained that the 
right to privacy could be inferred through the “zones of privacy,” or 
areas safe from government intrusion, found and protected within the 
penumbra of several different amendments.73 
Thus, the right to privacy has been deemed a fundamental right 
and is deeply rooted in our society’s values and consciousness.74 There 
have been various cases on the topic of privacy and its potential for 
infringement, which have led to many discussions on the dichotomy 
of private and public spaces. The general understanding is that “privacy 
is ‘dead’ once you walk out your front door or expose your activities 
to anyone else.”75 The Fourth Amendment and the Third Party 
Doctrine76 have led the Supreme Court to utilize the “assumption of 
risk” concept, where once information is revealed to a third party, it is 
no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment and the individual 
                                                 
 72 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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assumes the risk of disclosure.77 But this concept of losing one’s right 
to privacy upon exiting their front door or revealing something to a 
third party does not coincide with our technologically dependent 
society. The way we communicate and live our lives leaves us with “no 
meaningful choice in today’s world as to whether or not a digital 
footprint” is created, which complicates further the interpretation of 
public and private.78 Even in public, people have expectations of 
privacy—expectations that have since been acknowledged as protected 
by the Supreme Court dependent upon the location and the 
circumstances. 
The disclosure and dissemination of the recordings that are a 
product of surveillance or sousveillance require a balance between the 
“two revered democratic values of transparency and privacy.”79 The 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was enacted to “give people 
the right to demand access to records held by the government to 
facilitate transparency, guard against abuses, and build public trust.”80 
Each state now has a freedom of information law permitting citizens 
to request records.81 For example, the Pennsylvania Right to Know 
Law is a “series of laws designed to guarantee that the public has access 
to public records of governmental bodies.”82 Another example is the 
New York Freedom of Information Law, “a series of laws designed to 
guarantee that the public has access to public records of governmental 
bodies in New York.”83 
                                                 
 77 Skinner-Thompson, supra note 75, at 1680–81 (explaining that assumption 
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FOIA has had vast courtroom implications due to the act 
permitting the disclosure of the recordings and photographs produced 
from surveillance and sousveillance.84 These photographs and 
recordings could be used as evidence in a criminal trial, which “can 
bring that outside event directly into the courtroom to support or 
contradict [] testimony.”85 The display of surveillance or sousveillance 
footage can eliminate the “built-in credibility gap”86 where bias is given 
in favor of the police officer’s testimony. On the other hand, to protect 
privacy, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), contained within 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), “prohibits 
unauthorized access to stored communications, such as email, and 
disclosure of their contents.”87 Both of these acts in conjunction with 
one another are somewhat effective ways of “balancing these privacy 
interests with the important societal interest in promoting effective and 
efficient police work.”88 
3. Case Law  
There were “no major Fourth Amendment cases for 100 
years” until the Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United States in 1886.89 
In Boyd v. United States, the topic of informational security and 
infiltration into one’s “privately held . . . information” was discussed.90 
The Supreme Court in Boyd dictated a far-reaching Fourth Amendment 
protection.91 Over time, the “trespass doctrine” began to be used more 
frequently, which had more specific language that “focused on the 
textual language of ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”92 
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The Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States in 1967 yet 
again altered the expectation of privacy standard.93 In Katz, law 
enforcement officials placed a listening device on the exterior of a 
telephone booth, which the defendant argued was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment as it was a constitutionally protected area.94 The 
Court in Katz established that the “reasonable expectation of privacy 
test has controlled the threshold analysis of whether a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred.”95 The test contains two parts: (1) 
“that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and (2) “that the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”96 This analysis was significant because it 
acknowledged a presence of a “constitutionally protected interest 
separate from any place and distinct from tangible property.”97 
United States v. Jones was decided by the Supreme Court in 2012 
and is yet another significant case in the establishment of a balance 
between privacy and surveillance.98 In Jones, the government installed a 
GPS tracking device on Jones’ vehicle and tracked it for twenty-eight 
days.99 The concurrences in this case addressed the privacy and 
surveillance balance within the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” doctrine, which “found that the GPS tracking constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.”100 The Court revealed a 
growing concern for the increase of technology in our digital society 
and how it has the potential to aggregate and impact our fundamental 
rights and expectations of privacy.101 
As society’s expectations have developed over time and 
technology has advanced, citizens’ media and sousveillance have made 
their way to the forefront of the discussion on surveillance and privacy. 
Recent cases, such as the cases of Rodney King and Oscar Grant, 
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reveal the role of media—specifically the role of media in police 
accountability and evidence in criminal trials. In the Rodney King case 
in 1991, a bystander used a Sony Camcorder to record police officers 
beating Rodney King with batons.102 The video recording was then 
publicized on a local television station, which resulted in a public 
outcry against police brutality.103 Thus, the ability to record and the 
capability to access a wide network of people through the use of 
technology illustrates how digital advancement influences our 
thoughts on police and privacy. The Oscar Grant case in 2009 involved 
passengers recording an officer shooting Oscar Grant “while Grant 
was lying on the subway platform, supposedly resisting restraint.”104 
Unlike the Rodney King case, these recordings were subsequently 
uploaded to the platform of YouTube, which led to its use as evidence 
resulting in the officer’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter in 
2010.105 
In the landmark case Glik v. Cunniffe, decided in the First 
Circuit, Simon Glik used his cellphone to record police officers using 
what he thought was “unnecessary force to affect an arrest.”106 When 
the police questioned Glik as to his actions, he responded that he was 
recording the events and he was arrested “for unlawful audio recording 
in violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute” as well as “disturbing 
the peace and aiding in the escape of a prisoner.”107 The case was 
eventually dismissed, so Glik brought a civil suit.108 The Court’s 
analysis in this suit constitutes the legacy of the Glik case.109 The First 
Circuit recognized the “First Amendment right to record police 
conduct in public places” and the Seventh Circuit echoed this.110 
Before this right was established, if a “citizen visibly wrote down an 
officer’s shield number, the result was often an arrest for interfering 
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with a police officer or disorderly conduct.”111 This right to record 
changed the “role of the citizen journalist” and along with the aid of 
advancing technology, “fundamentally changed the nature of 
policing.”112 
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SURVEILLANCE 
One’s opinion toward surveillance will inevitably color the way 
they describe the advantages and disadvantages so this section will 
provide both sides to be evaluated and balanced for several common 
methods of surveillance: CCTV, police body cameras, and 
sousveillance. 
A. Closed Circuit Television 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) allows for the constant and 
efficient aggregation of images and information.113 As technology 
became more sophisticated, the capabilities and functions of the 
equipment that utilize these programs expanded exponentially.114 Many 
of the cameras now used for CCTV “are now fitted with full pan, tilt, 
and zoom capabilities, and record in high-resolution colour, while a 
small but gradually increasing number also utilize sophisticated night 
vision, motion detection, and automatic tracking technologies.”115 
Despite the benefits provided to law enforcement, these technological 
advancements have some troubling consequences. 
CCTV allows law enforcement to install cameras, which collect 
data about the movements of citizens over a span of time, without 
having to utilize vast amounts of manpower as required in the past.116 
This has resulted in “improved response times” and has promoted 
officer safety due to advanced knowledge of the situation to which an 
officer is responding.117 Thus, this promotion of efficiency reveals a 
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departure from the previous method of surveillance: the collected 
footage permits law enforcement to analyze the data and subsequently 
evaluate where to allocate their resources, rather than relying on 
officers’ discretion and observations. Law enforcement no longer has 
to weigh the “value and intrusiveness of the surveillance against the 
resources required to carry it out” because the equipment is cheaper 
now because of quantity and availability.118 Although the efficiency and 
price remove several barriers for law enforcement, these can be 
portrayed as disadvantages as well because it has consequences for the 
public. As a result of this removal of the requirement to balance due 
to the price, the threshold for justification of CCTV placement is 
lowered and removes the need to contemplate resource management 
carefully, which can lead to an abundance of cameras being arbitrarily 
installed.119  
Although the “cameras are not in and of themselves 
intrusive,”120 the availability and placement, as well as the way in which 
they are used and operated, have the potential to impact the general 
public sentiment toward surveillance as well as the privacy rights of 
citizens. With regard to use, the constant watch of CCTV cameras 
possibly infringes on privacy rights deemed fundamental to the public; 
with regards to operation, the ability to continuously record, collect, 
and store CCTV footage and data through the use of technology also 
poses some privacy issues. Data storage, the “archiving of police 
footage,” has the potential to infringe upon the privacy interests of 
innocent bystanders indirectly involved with the crime or disturbance 
at hand because “the release of such footage under state disclosure 
laws threatens to ‘embarrass’ innocent bystanders caught on tape.”121 
Data storage also complicates citizens’ public expectation of privacy 
because, although they might understand that what they expose to the 
public is not private, “what they do not expect is that each of those 
moments will be recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery 
and analysis.”122 This contrast between an officer’s and a citizen’s 
memory of an event versus permanent recordings presents both 
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advantages and disadvantages.123 Footage is permanent and will not 
fade or become distorted, like a memory can, and footage can be 
reviewed more than once “to yield the big picture.”124 However, the 
“recording may pick up single, highly sensitive moments in time that 
would otherwise be essentially anonymous,”125 and the public has the 
opportunity to retrospectively scrutinize the actions of law 
enforcement who must act with their discretion in the moment.  
Deterrence is a widely used justification for surveillance; 
CCTV allows the “police greater control over information and their 
environment” by allowing them to assess the recordings and place the 
cameras in areas where crime is frequent and they are needed.126 The 
knowledge that cameras are present has the potential to deter crime 
out of fear of being caught and having the recording used as evidence, 
but it is a double-edged sword: the awareness of the ever-recording 
cameras can create a false sense of security where citizens lower their 
vigilance while in public, making themselves more susceptible to 
crime.127 Additionally, research suggests that “evidence that 
surveillance cameras deter crime is mixed at best.”128    
As previously mentioned, CCTV’s ability to constantly record 
aids law enforcement’s resource management, but consider the fact 
that “one camera recording constantly over a 24-hour period will 
produce 1,440 minutes of surveillance data, and if that camera is 
located on a central shopping street, on a busy day it could conceivably 
record the movements of literally thousands of people.”129 This 
depiction prompts the common reference to George Orwell’s novel, 
1984.130 Orwell notes this dystopian feeling that instills images of Big 
Brother constantly watching their every move in the minds of the 
public, which results in fear and skepticism of law enforcement and 
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government.131 Orwell’s depiction of government intrusion and 
surveillance has provided a “benchmark against which actual efforts to 
establish a ‘surveillance society’ can be measured.”132  
The right to privacy and anonymity while in public are 
“instrumentally connected with restraining government power.”133 
Measures must be in place for citizens to combat this interference or 
to have “the ability to command non-interference in the first place,” 
which would enable a balance between the conflicting interests.134 
B. Police Body Cameras 
Police body cameras are a newly developed form of technology 
used by law enforcement which has come swiftly into the purview and 
vernacular of the public due to the wide exposure these devices have 
received from several of the high-profile cases mentioned above. They 
have become known for their function of accountability and 
transparency, but there are also drawbacks to police body cameras as 
well.135 These devices are similar to CCTV but have different 
implications for privacy due to their size, mobility, and proximity.136 
Because of the intrusive recordings of the encounters and how detailed 
the body camera recording is, disclosure could have “more egregious 
results.”137 
One of the main balances faced when using police body 
cameras is the “clash between transparency and privacy.”138 The 
camera is placed on the officer’s body and records the encounters the 
officer is involved in; this promotes accountability, transparency, and 
increased police visibility because the recording is evidence which 
diminishes the deference given to police narratives, protects police 
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from false complaints, and serves to remind police that they are being 
monitored and need to act accordingly to avoid the repercussions.139 
The footage from police body cameras can be used as evidence 
“for or against officer or citizen misconduct.”140 The footage provides 
accuracy and can be replayed, but this can also decontextualize events 
and lead to “judgments about the wrongness/rightness of police action 
based on small windows of reality that ignore some relevant 
context.”141 These body cameras’ “recording encounters can help 
rebuild public trust, improve public as well as officer behavior, and 
protect against false complaints,”142 but that depends upon whether 
they are being utilized properly. Whether the body camera is always on 
or not also matters because there are corresponding issues, including 
“[i]f body worn cameras are set to record as a default, they can also 
take on a constant, pervasive monitoring role”143 versus leaving it to 
the officer’s discretion. 
Several other facets of body cameras need to be taken into 
account including: they are “expensive to purchase and deploy, 
increase administrative burdens, require both rigorous review and 
supervisor action to reap accountability benefits, and their use may 
decrease the quality of public-police interaction.”144 These recordings 
have led to a turbulent relationship between law enforcement and the 
public, so law enforcement image management has been made more 
difficult because their actions are now subject to outside scrutiny.145 
There is also a dystopian feeling that is invoked by the cameras because 
not only are the police officer’s eyes on citizens, but the encounter is 
being recorded as well. The relationship between the police officer 
with the body cameras and the public was equated with prisoners in 
Bentham’s Panopticon prison where they are have the potential to be 
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constantly surveyed by guards so they unaware when they are not 
under the watchful eye.146 
These body cameras also give rise to various privacy concerns. 
They “exact a privacy price” and may chill communications and inhibit 
victims from speaking freely to officers because of the fear of 
recording and data storage.147 The “risk of deterring victims from 
seeking help at all”148 is not the goal of these devices, so the risk should 
be considered in the overall balancing of interests in the use of these 
devices. Another privacy concern involves innocent bystanders and 
data storage—again, because the “people who, unwittingly, and 
perhaps with no involvement in the incident being investigated, are 
revealed on a widely distributed video” have privacy interests, too.149 
All of these factors and interests need to be balanced when considering 
when and how to employ police body cameras. 
C. Sousveillance 
Sousveillance is a term used to describe citizens’ ability to 
record events on their cellphones or other devices and their capability 
to disseminate the recording to a wide network.150 Sousveillance, 
meaning “watching from below,”151 contrasts with surveillance which 
“evok[es] a watchful gaze over or above the subject.”152 
Sousveillance has been utilized by citizens for privacy self-
defense in order to battle back against the concept of Big Brother as 
well as to hold police accountable.153 This “ever-widening gaze of the 
public” has the potential to promote deterrence by exposing the police 
to public scrutiny and increasing officers’ awareness that their actions 
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may be recorded.154 The goal is to force the police to reflect on their 
behavior and may result in an “increase [in] internal monitoring of its 
behaviors and legal compliance” which may have long-term effects.155 
Our societal dependence on technology results in citizens 
being recorded on camera an alarming amount of times whether it is 
“in selfies, in group photos, in recorded events, and more.”156 A 
statistic from 2014 shows that, on average, “every day people uploaded 
1.8 billion digital images—a total of 657 billion photos a year.”157 This 
abundance of sousveillance has the potential to be used as evidence in 
a trial; as mentioned above, FOIA allows for the disclosure of the 
recordings and photographs produced from surveillance and 
sousveillance.158 Although these photographs and recordings can be 
used for the purpose of police accountability and transparency, 
constant exposure not only to government surveillance but also to 
other citizens’ sousveillance compounds the dystopian feeling of being 
constantly watched, both knowingly and unknowingly. 
Similar to body cameras, those citizens using sousveillance 
must also recognize the privacy interests of innocent bystanders “who, 
unwittingly, and perhaps with no involvement in the incident being 
investigated, are revealed on a widely distributed video.”159 
Another factor to consider regarding sousveillance is the 
uncertainty of protection for citizens who record the police and the 
potential risk of prosecution they face when they do record. Because 
of the rapidly changing field of technology, additional constitutional 
issues are being raised “about what right citizens should have to 
document and disseminate information about government conduct 
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and the state’s ability to prohibit recordings by private citizens.”160 
Since there is no consensus among states on this topic, “citizens 
remain at substantial risk when deciding whether to pull out their 
smartphone and record the scenes unfolding around them.”161 Because 
the legality to record police varies by state, citizens may choose not to 
act out of fear of prosecution, which will allow “abusive conduct to go 
unverified and potentially unnoticed by those in a position to remedy 
wrongs or provide justice to the abused.”162 If the citizen does record 
the events, then they have several choices of what to do with the 
footage: (1) they could turn it over to the police and potentially face 
prosecution; (2) they could post it to the Internet and also potentially 
face prosecution; (3) they could destroy the footage which could be 
considered unlawful destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice, 
or (4) they could keep it to themselves and allow the abuse to go 
unpunished.163 Therefore, this uncertainty surrounding citizens’ ability 
to record, yet again, places citizens in a questionable spot requiring 
them to balance their rights and justice against the risk of prosecution 
and allowing abuse to go unpunished. 
The advantages and disadvantages of sousveillance such as 
accountability, transparency, use as evidence, risk of prosecution, third 
party privacy interests all need to be considered when deciding whether 
or not to record, in the split-second the event is occurring. 
V.   THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE U.K. SYSTEM IN 
THE U.S. 
Although the United Kingdom’s system may provide some 
useful techniques for employing surveillance that can be used to help 
balance the crime control agenda and the constitutional privacy issues 
faced in the United States, the United States would be unable to utilize 
the exact United Kingdom’s mass surveillance system. This would be 
the case because of a number of contributing factors, namely (1) 
                                                 
 160 Newell, supra note 5, at 70. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 95–96. 
 163 Id. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
516 
implementation, (2) no comprehensive option, and (3) size and 
centralization. 
A. Potential Problem #1: Implementation 
Implementation of the United Kingdom’s system in the United 
States poses a problem because of the timing and the nature in which 
it was installed in the United Kingdom.164 Crime was a major concern 
in the United Kingdom, so “politicians and policy-makers were in 
search of a new solution to the problem of crime and, perhaps more 
importantly, a way of convincing the public that they were serious 
about crime prevention.”165 
This shift in mentality with regard to crime needed to be in the 
minds not only of motivated politicians and those in power, but also 
of the general public.166 Thus, a centralized front needed to be put forth 
on the pending problem of crime. This shift in mentality resulted in 
the proposal of CCTV, which provided the assurance of crime 
prevention/deterrence as well as a more effective way to analyze where 
resources were needed.167 Only in the United Kingdom “did 
government and the public accept at face value claims about the 
CCTV’s supposed benefits. . . .”168 This blind acceptance, whether it 
was because of the fear of crime or that it was pretty well known that 
the Home Office did not welcome criticism of CCTV, allowed for the 
rapid implementation and expansion of CCTV throughout the United 
Kingdom.169 This quick, widespread employment of CCTV left limited 
time for backlash and came at a time where crime was running 
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rampant.170 The shift in rationale with regard to crime allowed CCTV 
to become an engrained part of life in the United Kingdom.171 
While the United States and United Kingdom share “[t]he 
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna 
Carta,”172 the American and UK approaches to privacy differ. In the 
United States, a balance between disclosure and privacy rights needs 
to be kept. The values and concerns about crime and privacy concerns 
in the United Kingdom when CCTV became widespread during the 
1970s and 1980s were different, and technology has marched on.173 
Today, in the United States, if there was a rapid installment of CCTV 
around the country, there would be many bureaucratic steps to satisfy 
prior to installation and use, and an opposition would likely form 
almost immediately because of the instantaneous access to and spread 
of information. Therefore, there would not be as smooth of a 
transition in the United States as the United Kingdom experienced. 
B. Potential Problem #2: No Comprehensive Option 
Transparency and privacy are deeply rooted in the United 
States and are considered “two revered democratic values.”174 
Protecting privacy is exemplified in the Constitution in several places, 
and vivid examples of trying to protect it can be seen as far back as 
preventing the quartering of soldiers in one’s home during 
peacetime.175 Today, advancements in technology have brought 
privacy, disclosure, and transparency to the forefront. But this is just 
how the issue has developed in the United States; the development of 
privacy, disclosure, and transparency “will rely on the legal system, 
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practice and culture of each country.”176 Each country has a different 
history and different values which lead to privacy being an “inherently 
contextual, culturally dependent concept.”177 An attempt to impose the 
values and system from the United Kingdom into the United States 
would not result in a seamless transition because “[l]awmakers often 
create problems when they attempt to impose one country or culture’s 
privacy sensibilities across cultures and individuals” because one size 
does not fit all.178 
The United Kingdom has no written constitution and no 
general right to privacy, whereas the United States has a written 
constitution and a fundamental right to privacy grounded in several 
sources, including the penumbra of rights cited in Griswold.179 Because 
the United Kingdom does not have explicit rights and there has not 
been a lot of government restraint on surveillance, the “legitimate use 
of CCTV and the limits that should be placed on public area 
surveillance has fallen to local officials and police officers.”180 In the 
United States, each state’s laws dictate much of the restrictions on 
surveillance in order to protect citizens’ right to privacy.181 
Sousveillance has become more of a common method utilized by 
citizens for privacy self-defense to battle back against the concept of 
Big Brother and to hold police accountable.182 The prevalence of 
sousveillance changes the power dynamic between police and citizens 
in the United States while in the United Kingdom much of the 
decision-making is left in the hands of police. 
The phrase “to preserve public safety” is often the rationale 
used as a justification for government action.183 In the United 
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Kingdom, the typical justification for the use of surveillance has been 
the “security rationale” regarding public safety concerns.184 But 
especially in the United States, this security rationale has been 
considered “not persuasive, as freedom of expression and privacy 
concerns have consistently trumped security considerations since the 
dawn of the Internet. . . .”185 The public safety and security rationale 
can be very easily manipulated and can be molded to apply to many 
different situations. To allow the government vast discretion, with little 
to no supervision or limit, is grounds for abuse. Therefore, more 
evidence would be needed to bolster the reasoning for surveillance 
systems in the United States. 
The United Kingdom also has its own version of FOIA for 
disclosure purposes, but the United States’ version of FOIA is 
significantly more extensive: the federal government has one act and 
each individual state has its own FOIA.186 This illustrates the emphasis 
the United States places on the balance between transparency and 
privacy. 
C. Potential Problem #3: Size and Centralization 
The size and centralization of the United Kingdom’s system 
differ significantly from those of the United States. According to the 
United States Census Bureau, the United Kingdom has a population 
of approximately 65 million while the United States has a population 
of approximately 326 million.187 To put into perspective just how 
massive the difference in size between these two countries truly is, 
California alone has a population of approximately 39 million, which 
is more than half the population of the United Kingdom.188 
Because the size of the population of the countries and the 
cities within them are so drastically different, trying to implement the 
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system and extrapolate it to such a degree would present great 
difficulty. Even if the system could be executed, the effectiveness 
would be significantly diminished because of the increased expense of 
materials and resources needed to cover more territory—not to 
mention the increased amount of potential opposition that could be 
faced. 
The United States’ system of surveillance is much more 
decentralized than the United Kingdom’s due to its structure and 
organization of government; for example, “[b]ody camera policies are 
much more decentralized in the United States compared to the United 
Kingdom, reflecting the view that criminal law enforcement is a 
‘traditional state function[].’”189 Implementation of the United 
Kingdom’s system of surveillance would be near impossible in the 
United States without centralizing all the power over decisions 
regarding surveillance to the federal government which would infringe 
on the states’ powers and place federalism in question.190 Not only do 
American values pose a problem for utilizing the United Kingdom’s 
surveillance system, the size of the United States and the structure and 
organization of the government do as well. 
D. Potential Problem #4: Further Clarification Needed 
In the international context, no overarching standards exist 
that deal “with or that strike the balance between the use of those 
enhanced investigative tools for crime prevention, detection and 
investigation on one hand and the protection of the private life of 
individuals and other related rights on the other.”191 Because of the 
lack of legal safeguards and differences between each countries’ 
approach to the subject, there is limited clarity on the topic. A possible 
remedy to this could possibly be achieved by developing some form of 
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“common language of privacy” to provide some stability and clarity 
within privacy laws in different countries.192 
As evidenced earlier, some of the case law in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, including Friedl v. Austria, Peck v. United 
Kingdom, and Katz v. United States, demonstrates how the lines are still 
blurred with respect to privacy rights and what is considered public 
versus private.193 This lack of clarity leads to a lot of discretion being 
left in the hands of the courts because without standards or precedent 
to follow, the court must conduct a fact specific analysis on a case-by-
case basis. As technology continues to advance, these lines will only 
become blurrier and the docket of the courts will become increasingly 
inundated if something does not change. The law must keep pace with 
technology.194 
In order for the law to keep pace with technology, “nations 
should aim to model future legislation within their countries on 
existing internet norms such as freedom of expression, transparency, 
and privacy.”195 The Third Party Doctrine and the Assumption of Risk 
notion,196 which are currently used to determine when privacy rights 
are lost, are both outlooks on privacy that are somewhat outdated 
because they are not applicable to the very interconnected and 
accessible way people live their lives now.197 These notions do not 
allow their concepts to transcend through time because they did not 
account for technology’s evolution. As previously mentioned, if the 
citizen does record the events, then they have several choices of what 
to do with the footage: (1) turning it over to the police and potentially 
face prosecution; (2) posting it to the Internet and also potentially face 
prosecution; (3) destroying it which could be considered unlawful 
destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice; or (4) keeping it to 
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themselves and allow the abuse to go unpunished.198 These choices 
place a lot of pressure on citizens and force them to decide whether or 
not to record in the split-second the event is occurring.199 Currently, 
citizens are left with limited suitable options, and many common 
citizens do not fully understand the nuances of sousveillance law and 
its potential ramifications due to the lack of clarity and unification on 
the subject.200 Thus, promoting a more centralized, unified view, as 
opposed to each state differing, would be more beneficial. Therefore, 
if countries aim to model their future legislation on existing internet 
norms, not only will this allow the countries to adapt to the changing 
expression of privacy rights but these norms will allow for the 
development of the aforementioned “common language of privacy.”201 
Another rapidly advancing feature of the privacy discussion 
that needs to be addressed in order for the law to keep pace with 
technology is citizens’ media. Citizens’ media, if used correctly, allows 
citizens to better hold police officers accountable, but it is a double-
edged sword.202 On one hand, it allows citizens to utilize their 
individual forms of technology to promote deterrence of police officer 
misbehavior, while the government is able to watch the citizens via 
CCTV, body cameras, etc.203 On the other hand, it increases the 
dystopian feeling of constantly being watched and a large cloud of 
uncertainty also surrounds citizens’ media when it comes to the 
protection available for citizens who record the police and the 
potential risk of prosecution they face when they do record.204 Both 
arguments can be seen in the above-mentioned cases of the deaths of 
Ian Tomlinson, Rodney King, Oscar Grant, and Glik v. Cunniffe to 
name a few instances.205 Therefore, proper channels for reporting 
citizens’ media footage and sousveillance need to be developed in 
order to make this feature more effective and reduce the uncertainty. 
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This sousveillance not only impacts those recording and the subjects 
of the recording, it also impacts innocent bystanders who happen to 
be included in the footage.206 Because of the balance of privacy rights 
and disclosure as well as the level of archiving involved with the 
footage recorded, citizens media that is reported has the potential for 
infringing upon the privacy interests of innocent bystanders indirectly 
involved with the crime or disturbance at hand because “the release of 
such footage under state disclosure laws threatens to ‘embarrass’ 
innocent bystanders caught on tape. . . .”207 Although they understand 
that they are in public, they do not necessarily comprehend that they 
will be “recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery and 
analysis. . . .”208 This may be considered an unavoidable by-product of 
citizens’ media because it is a split second decision to record the action 
at hand so one is unable to obtain permission from all those in the 
area, but perhaps there is a solution yet to be discovered. 
An additional element to consider is the intrusive nature of 
body cameras. When police officers wear these cameras, a dystopian 
feeling may be invoked because not only are the police officer’s eyes 
on citizens, but the encounter is being recorded as well.209 When police 
officers come to an individual’s door wearing these body cameras, it 
allows them to record and store details about that person’s home that 
is normally considered private.210 The awareness of these devices 
recording everything in their purview, both video and sound, may 
result in citizens’ fear to speak, which will chill the communications 
between citizens and police.211 
VI.  POTENTIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE 
Although implementation of the United Kingdom system does 
not appear plausible in the United States, there are other suggestions 
of how to provide some clarity to privacy rights in the United States. 
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Listed below are several ways to categorize data, consider the Fourth 
Amendment implications in the digital age, and balance privacy rights 
and disclosure, but none are without their respective flaws. 
A. Suggestion 1: Houses, Papers, and Effects 
The first suggestion to providing some clarity and adapting to 
the changing times would be to consider a textual reading of the 
Fourth Amendment. “Underlying the [Fourth Amendment’s] 
protection of persons, papers, homes, and effects and behind the 
expectation of privacy lies a desire to guard personal information from 
government intrusion.”212 When looking at the wording of this text, 
these recordings can be considered protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because of the application of “persons,” “papers,” or 
“effects.”213 
To analyze this under the category of “persons,” one would 
have to consider, as previously mentioned, that on a daily basis we each 
create a digital footprint, or “digital self,” which reveals many personal 
details about ourselves such as places we frequent, people we speak 
with, photographs, etc.214 This record of information can be 
considered to be a representation of us as a person and therefore that 
information is placed within the realm of protection.215 
To analyze this under the category of “papers,” one would 
have to consider that digital information is the modern day equivalent 
of papers.216 “Whether the data is physical or digital should have little 
bearing on whether or not it is considered private.”217 
To analyze this under the category of “effects,” one would 
have to consider factors other than the digital nature of the documents 
or files and their location, such as “the nature of the item, its 
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relationship to other items, and whether the owner has taken steps to 
shield the information from public scrutiny.”218 
Although these categorizations propose compelling 
arguments, the argument would need to be solidified in writing with 
concrete yet malleable language to attend to our changing 
technological landscape and the individualized nature of these cases 
requires an in depth analysis from the court system which could 
potentially lead to an influx of cases. 
B. Suggestion 2: Informational Curtilage 
Another suggestion to “guide future Fourth Amendment 
analysis” is the theory of “informational curtilage.”219 This theory 
would allow the analysis to be appropriate for the digital age in which 
we live instead of the “physical intrusion/trespass test and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test currently in use.”220 
Curtilage is “a protective area around the home that secures 
the area from outside interference or observation.”221 This is typically 
applied to porches or other areas that are so closely associated with the 
home that they receive the same protections. The theory of 
informational curtilage considers “the proximity/derivative 
connection to the constitutional source, the steps taken to mark out or 
protect the information, and the nature of the uses of that 
information.”222 Factors would need to be developed in order to apply 
this theory, such as what constitutes the home and what the parameters 
of the surrounding protected area would be, and as previously 
mentioned, the law needs to catch up to technology so it would take 
time to implement this theory.223 
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C. Suggestion 3: Multiple Factor Test 
The United States faces the somewhat unique problem of 
balancing privacy rights and disclosure. This has proven very difficult 
and fact driven in the several cases discussed in this comment.224 The 
constant advancement of technology has changed the amount of 
information available and the speed at which one can obtain it.225 A 
five-factor test using factors from existing case law to maintain the 
necessary balance may bring some clarity to the dilemma.226 The five 
factors include: 
(1) the duration of the surveillance; (2) the lowering of 
structural barriers to pervasive surveillance, reflected in 
the greatly reduced cost of tracking; (3) the recording 
of an individual’s or group’s movements; (4) the 
elicitation of information from within a protected 
space such as a home; and, as appropriate, (5) whether 
the technology undermines core constitutional rights 
and (6) whether surveillance technologies are piggy-
backed on each other.227 
These factors allow the courts to use previously identified 
factors, which creates less work from them and allows them to analyze 
their particular case within an already established framework.228 They 
also have precedent to rely on when making the decisions for each 
individual factor.229 
D. Suggestion 4: Limiting Video Retention and Automatic Redaction 
The previously implemented possibilities of dealing with the 
potential infringements of privacy rights due to body camera footage 
were individual consent, officer discretion, statutory exclusion, which 
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are all problematic and flawed.230 A better balance needs to be struck 
between privacy and disclosure. 
To promote a better balance, law enforcement should reduce 
“the amount of video retained, by shortening retention periods and 
narrowing long-term retention to videos showing use of force and 
other events of public interest. . . .”231 Shorter retention periods will 
place a time limit on the availability of information which will promote 
a more fluid system and the narrowed long term retention time will 
require officers to provide valid, evidence backed reasons to justify 
why the footage should be kept.232 The problem this poses is similar to 
that of the advancements with DNA now being applied to unsolved 
cases in the past; if these videos are disposed of after a certain period 
of time has elapsed, they will not be available in the future if technology 
changes to increase our capabilities.233 
Alternatively, “improving the way videos are stored and 
deploying rapidly-improving software aids can reduce the 
administrative burden of complying with Open Government/Records 
Acts.”234 Although this does promote the balance of privacy and 
disclosure, the use of software to perform tasks is not completely 
unflawed when bearing in mind innocent bystanders and their privacy 
concerns, which have the potential to be distributed on a widespread 
video, the suggestion of automatic redaction rather than enacting 
exemptions was broached.235 It was eventually deemed problematic 
because “the current limits of software and technology make redacting 
a herculean task” and quite burdensome for those involved.236 The use 
of software will promote the connection between law and technology 
but it still requires officers to attempt to predict future controversies 
of which videos to retain which is also problematic.237 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
When making decisions regarding privacy, disclosure, and 
surveillance, there are many things to consider. Surveillance and 
sousveillance pose double-edged swords with the benefits of risk 
assessment, data collection, deterrence and solving crime as well as the 
concerns of anonymity and privacy, the dystopian feeling, and data 
storage. How surveillance is utilized and how the privacy of  citizens is 
protected varies by country, as evidenced by the United Kingdom and 
United States. Each country needs a system of  surveillance that is 
tailored to the rights, needs, and circumstances of  their citizens, but 
overarching standards should be clarified so that they can be utilized 
as guides. For the United States, a balance needs to be struck between 
the government’s disclosure obligations and citizens’ privacy rights in 
order for the system to be effective. Although I do not believe the 
United Kingdom’s entire system of  surveillance could be implemented 
in the United States for several reasons, I do think that by examining 
surveillance systems other than our own, we are able to learn things 
from other methodologies and could potentially implement or 
integrate some of  the useful techniques into our surveillance model to 
improve. 
The amount of traceable information we generate increases 
daily so safeguards need to be put into place properly to adequately 
balance the availability of information with privacy rights and the law 
needs to keep pace with the advances in technology. Michiko Kakutani 
discussed a relevant example of this in a New York Times article when 
she said, “[a] world in which Big Brother . . . is always listening in, and 
high-tech devices can eavesdrop in people’s homes” and referenced 
the Amazon Alexa device (“Alexa”).238 This device is one that has 
infiltrated many homes and businesses within the last five years and 
has many different features and capabilities that update frequently. 
Alexa has voice recognition and is able to be connected to control 
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various other technologies in one’s home, including the lights.239 The 
abilities of this device are reminiscent of Orwell’s 1984 in terms of 
potential government intrusion and listening devices if not monitored 
properly and the implications of data storage remain unclear.240 This 
potential source of surveillance is only one example of the digital 
footprint we, intentionally or unintentionally, produce every day.241 
Another example can be found in China where “170 million 
CCTV cameras are already in place and an estimated 400 million new 
ones will be installed in the next three years.”242 Although the sheer 
number is overwhelming, this camera network is truly distinguished 
from others due to its capabilities; the extent of the pervasiveness of 
these CCTV cameras equipped with artificial intelligence and facial 
recognition was seen in Guiyang, China when a BBC reporter “was 
located and captured by the Chinese police in just seven minutes in a 
stunt to demonstrate the power and effectiveness of the government’s 
surveillance systems.”243 The rapid proliferation of these devices can 
be seen all over the world but privacy and retention are several issues 
to be mindful of. 
Because of this rapid advancement of technology and how 
often individuals interact with it on a daily business not only in public 
but in their homes as well, future legislation cannot be static; it needs 
to be malleable in order for it to allow the law to keep pace with 
technological advancement. 
                                                 
 239 Amelia Tait, Amazon Echo: How 2016 Tech is Bringing Us Closer to 1984, 
NEWSTATESMAN (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.newstatesman.com/science-
tech/privacy/2016/09/amazon-echo-how-2016-tech-bringing-us-closer-1984. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Donohue, supra note 1, at 679. 
 242 Joyce Liu, In Your Face: China’s All-Seeing State, BBC (Dec. 10, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-42248056/in-your-face-china-s-
all-seeing-state. 
 243 Id.; Christina Zhao, China Used Its Vast CCTV Surveillance Network to Track 
Down Reporter in Just Seven Minutes, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2017, 6:54 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/tasked-trying-remain-undetected-long-possible-
sudworth-filmed-himself-selfie-747843. 
